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It  is  argued  here  that  the  Nash  equilibrium  calculated  by Gradus 
(1989)  is not the  Nash  equilibrium  found when applying the definition 
generally employed in differential game theory. The model presented by 
Gradus would call for a modified Nash equilibrium concept as outlined in 
this note. 
In  a  paper  recently published  in  this  Journal, Gradus  (1989) 
analyses the interaction between a government and firms using dif- 
ferential  game techniques.  In this  note  I  do not intend  to go into 
the economic merits of this approach but I will concentrate on the 
derivation  of the  results,  in particular  the  Nash equilibrium.  It is 
argued here that the Nash equilibrium calculated by Gradus is not 
the  Nash  equilibrium  found  when  applying  the  definition  gen- 
erally employed in  differential  game theory. The  description  of a 
non-cooperative game involves a. o. a  specification of the players 
and of the strategy space of each player. In a standard formulation 
(see e. g.  Ba~ar and Olsder,  1982) these spaces are independent in 
the sense that the action of one player does not affect the range of 
strategies  open  to  the  other(s).  The  model  presented  by Gradus 
lacks this  property and would therefore call for a  modified  Nash 
equilibrium  concept,  preserving  the  basic  idea  that  each  player 
maximizes its pay-offs given the strategies followed by the other(s). 
In the case at hand this is relatively easy as will be outlined below 
in detail. 
* The  author  is  indebted  to  Jan  van  Geldrop  and  an  anonymous 
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In  the  model  the  government  decides  on  the  tax  rate  (v)  it 
imposes on the (aggregate)  firm. The firm takes this  rate  as given 
and selects labour (L) and investments (I) so as to maximize share- 
holders'  discounted welfare. The firm's problem is defined as fol- 
lows: 
T 
max I e-rs D(s) ds +  bK(T)  e -rT 
L,I, DO 
subject to 
pF(K(t),  L(t)) -  wL(t)  -  TX(t)  =  D(t) +  I.(t),  (1) 
TX(t)  =  v(t)(pF(K(t),  L(t))-  wL(t)-  aK(t)),  (2) 
Ii; (t) =  I (t) -  a g  (t), g  (o) =  Ko given,  (3) 
D (t) >  O,  (4) 
I(t) >_ O,  (5) 
where the symbols have the following meaning: 
T  the fixed finite horizon 
r  the constant rate of discount 
b  the value shareholders attach to a 3anit of capital left at T 
p  the constant price of output 
w  the constant wage rate 
K  capital 
L  labour 
F  production function 
TX  taxes 
D  dividends 
I  investments 
a  the constant rate of depreciation. 
It is assumed by Gradus that 0 <  b< 1. One could argue that it 
would be interesting to consider the case b > 1 as well, but this will 
not  be  gone  into  here.  The  same  applies  to  the  condition  that 
investments  are non-negative. 
The government's problem can be formulated as follows: 
T 
max I e-rs v(s) (pF (K (s), L(s)) -  wL(s)  -  aK (s)) ds 
r  0 
subject to 
0 <  1:1 <_ v(t) _< v2 <  1.  (6) A Differential Game between Government and Firms:  Comments  287 
So  Gradus  assumes  that  the  tax  rate  is  strictly positive  and 
strictly smaller than  unity. This  is  not  motivated. We  shall  deal 
with the case rl = 0,  32 = 1 below. 
Clearly the strategy space of the firm consists of the mappings 
L, I  and D  from [0, T] into ~  satisfying (1)--(5)  and this space is 
affected by the tax rate  r  appearing in (2).  The strategy space of 
the government is the set of mappings  z-: [0, T] -~ ~  satisfying (6). 
This  space  is  independent  of the  strategy space  of the  firm.  It 
seems perfectly in line with the traditional Nash equilibrium con- 
cept to define a  Nash equilibrium in the model at hand as a set of 
mappings (L*, I*, D*, 3") : [0, T] 4 -~ R  4 such that L*, I*, D* maxi- 
mizes the firm's pay-off subject to (1)--(5)  with r  replaced by r* 
and  such  that  r*  maximizes  the  government's  pay-off,  with 
L*, I*, D* and hence K* inserted, subject to (6). 
It  is  not  difficult to  solve  for this  equilibrium.  Consider the 
government first.  (We omit * in the sequel.)  For any moment in 
time we have 
r=rl  if  pF-wL-aK<O, 
ra<r_<r2  if  pF-wL-aK=O, 
r=rE  if  pF-wL-aK>O. 
The firm takes the tax rate as given. After some simple manipula- 
tions the Lagrangean of the firm's problem reads 
V= e -r' {(1 -  r)(pF-  wL) + raK-  1}+2(1-  aK) + l.qI + 
+#2  {(l -  r) (pF-  wL) + raK-  I} 
and the necessary conditions are 
])E  L  ~  w~ 
-  e-r'+  2  +  #1  -  #2  =  O, 
#1 -> O, ttlI=  O, 
#2 >  0, #2D =  #2 ((1 --  r) (pF-  wL) + "raK-  I) =  0, 
-  ,~ =  (e- r, +  #2) ((1 --  r) pFK + ra) -- 2a,  (7) 
2 (T) =  b e - rr  (8) 
It is assumed here that p  and w are such that, for any positive K, 
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of F  we have along a  solution 
pF-  wL-  aK =pFKK + pFLL-  wL-  aK = 
=(pFK-- a)K: = (q-  a) K, 
where q  is a  constant. 
Let us make a  distinction between several possible regimes. 
I>0,  D>0. 
Then #a = #2 = 0  and ~  =  e- ft. Furthermore 
-~  =  re-rt=  e- rt((1 -  r) q +  Ta). 
So  r--(1-r)  q+ra.  If  q-a=0,  this  implies  r=a.  If  a4~q 
then  ~'=r~  or  r=~'2  and  r=(1-ri)  q+~:ia  (i=1  or  i=2).  We 
shall assume,  as Gradus  implicitly does, that none of these rather 
special  conditions  is  satisfied.  So  the  case  I  <  0, D  >  0  will  not 
occur. 
I=D=0. 
D  =  ((1 -  r) q +  ra) K  ~  0 under the conditions given above. 
I>0,  D=0. 
Then #1 = 0  and/'L -  e - r1 =  #2 >  0. Furthermore 
-~  =  L(1-  r) (q-  a).  (9) 
I=0,  D>0. 
Then/z2--0 and ~  -  e-rt=  _  #1 -< 0.  Furthermore 
-~  =  e-r'(1-  r)(q-  a) +  e-r'a  -  A,a. 
The analysis from here is quite simple. Since pF-  wL -  aK = 
(q-a)  K, wehave  r=  rl if (q -  a) <  0  and  r= r2 if (q -  a) >  0. 
If (q -  a) <  0, then there is no interval of time with  I>0  and 
D = 0  because  otherwise  it  follows  from the  continuity  of ~  and 
the  fact  that  ~  is  increasing  in  such  intervals  (see  (9))  that 
~(T) > be -rT (recall  that  b<l).  But  this  contradicts  (8).  So,  if 
(q -  a) <  0,  ~-(t) ---- ~'1 and I(t) =  0 for all 0< t<  T. 
The interesting case is of course (q -  a) >  0. Then r(t)  =  rE for 
all  0< t <  T.  A  necessary  condition  for  positive  investment  is 
(1 -  r2) (q -  a) >  r,  (10) 
because  otherwise  (5)  is  not  satisfied.  However,  condition  (10), 
which is imposed by Gradus, is by no means sufficient for the exis- 
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differential equation (7) with ~-= r2 and 2 (7) =  be- ft. The solution 
is 
(1- ~a)(q-a)+a 
2 (t) =  r +  a  e -  rt  --I- 
+(b-(1-r2)(q-r_+aa)+a)  e_(r+a) r+a ' 
It  could  well  be  that  2C(0)<1,  in  which  case  I(t)=  0  for  all 
0_< t <  T. The results are summarized in the following 
Proposition:  If  (q-  a)<  0,  then  along  the  Nash  equilibrium 
r(t)=rl,  I(t)=0  for  all  t.  If  (q-a)>0,  then  there  exists 
tl (0 _< tz <  7)  with  tz  possibly equal  to  zero  such that  along the 
Nash equilibrium 
r(t)='c2,  I(t)>O  O<  t<  q, 
r(t)=  r2, I(t)=O  t~ <  t  <  T.  [] 
These results are in sharp contrast with those obtained by Gradus, 
where  (for q >  a) there  is an initial phase with the tax rate  at the 
minimum level. 
Finally, consider the case with ra = 0 and r2 = 1. Clearly r = 0 if 
(q -  a) < 0. So (q -  a) > 0 implies r > 0 and, in particular,  r = 1. But 
(1 -  r) (q -  a) r  >  0  is  a  necessary condition for positive  invest- 
ment.  Therefore,  along the  Nash  equilibrium  r  (t) =  1  and  I(t) 
=  0  for all  t. 
The conclusion is that Gradus employs an equilibrium concept 
in which the government does not take the firm's actions as given. 
This is not to say that Gradus confuses Nash and Stackelberg equi- 
libria, because his Stackelberg  equilibrium seems to be correct.  It 
is not clear however what equilibrium concept in the Nash sense 
has been used. 
Another conclusion going beyond this particular model, is that, 
since there exist many economic models where strategy spaces are 
interdependent,  these  must  be  handled  with  great  care  if one  is 
looking for a  Nash-like equilibrium. 
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